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E-mail address: l.putzel@cgiar.org (L. Putzel).From 1999, China launched the Conversion of Cropland to Forest Program, an expansive forest landscape
restoration project engaging 17% of the rural population in tree planting and management on ca. 30 mil-
lion ha of degraded land and farmland in vulnerable watersheds. We describe the emergence of innova-
tive institutions, horizontally and vertically networked from central to village government scales,
articulating forestry with planning, finance, land, agriculture and water sectors. Compensation to partic-
ipating households in grain was replaced by direct electronic cash transfers, promoting household fiscal
modernization and inclusive finance. Compensation based on the area of household forest plots has rein-
forced tenure reforms and associated certifications.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Launched in 1999, after droughts and floods exacerbated by
upstream deforestation, China’s Conversion of Cropland to Forest
Program (CCFP) has been implemented in the Yangtze and Yellow
river watersheds. Upstream afforestation is expected to mitigate
floods, soil erosion and desertification. The CCFP has provided sub-
sidies, initially as grain and later cash, to ‘‘retire” and afforest agri-
cultural or otherwise degraded sloping lands (P25 degrees) with
limited potential for food production. The $45 billion program
has contributed to the largest increase in forest cover among coun-
tries worldwide from 1990 to 2000. The CCFP has been imple-
mented in 1900 counties in 25 provinces, engaging 32 million
farm families or 124 million people (ca. 17% of the rural popula-
tion). Though established for purposes of environmental mitiga-
tion, the program added the goal of poverty alleviation, and has
become one of China’s largest rural development programs, featur-
ing both direct compensation to households and village-level
development assistance (Bennett, Xie, Hogarth, Peng, & Putzel,
2014).r Ltd.
icense (http://creativecommons.orgThe CCFP holds lessons for forest landscape restoration (FLR) on
farmlands worldwide as more countries pledge to the Bonn Chal-
lenge. Conservation and development often coordinate poorly
across sectors (e.g. forests, water), and face land tenure problems
or elite capture of financial resources. To address these problems,
the CCFP constructed a multi-scale cross-sector network, linking
institutions vertically from village to central government and hor-
izontally across sectoral agencies. Particularly innovative aspects
include:
 Integration with national forest tenure reforms transferring
rights and responsibilities over 180 million ha of forest land
to 500 million individual farmers;
 Use of new digital banking technologies, promoting moderniza-
tion of household finances and fiscal inclusion.
This perspective on China’s institutional innovations for FLR is
based on the authors’ observations and interviews with key infor-
mants from the central government, and at the provincial, county,
township and village levels in the four southwestern provinces of
Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Yunnan; interviews with 164
households in those provinces; and collaboration on papers (see
recommended reading). The purpose here is not to assess or com-
ment on socioeconomic or environmental outcomes of the CCFP,/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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et al., 2016), but to describe the development of institutions for
FLR.2. Institutional innovation and the CCFP: Multi-scale cross-
sector networking
The multiple goals of the CCFP – including environmental reme-
diation and forest production, social protection and socioeconomic
development, and trade-offs between agriculture and forestry –
required creating a new institution for horizontal and vertical coor-
dination and multi-level oversight (Fig. 1). Coordination among
sectors at all levels of government guides identification of lands
for conversion, design of forestry treatments, and engagement of
households as forestland stewards. A multi-layered system of
inspection ensures payment of subsidies reflects compliance to
agreed land use practices and tree survivorship.
The State Council (SC) launched the CCFP following a policy
formed by its Western Regions Development Department (Wes-
tern Department), which later moved into the National Develop-
ment and Reform Commission (NDRC), a body responsible for
national economic planning. The Western Department oversees
horizontal coordination of the CCFP among the NDRC, Administra-
tions of Forestry and Grain, respectively, and Ministries of Agricul-
ture, Water Resources, Land Resources, and Finance. Within the
State Forestry Administration (SFA), the CCFP Administration
Office was created in 1999 to draft policy in consultation with
the sectoral ministries, and to monitor implementation through a
specialist group tasked with regular inspections and impact assess-
ments in sampled counties. From the central government, the CCFP
Management Office establishes annual plans, approved by NDRC,
and delegates implementation to the provincial Development and
Reform Commission, which coordinates among provincial depart-
ments of forestry, agriculture, finance and land.
County governments, with oversight and technical guidance
from provincial forestry departments, are the major implementingFig. 1. The basic structure of the CCFP’s multi-scalar cross-sector network Simplified
implementation, inspection and incentive payments. The associated specific connectorsinstitutions at the sub-national level. Counties are responsible for
fulfilling restoration targets and assessing tree survival, which
are part of the evaluation of county governments’ and mayors’
annual performance. At this level, county governments coordinate
among sector departments to plan for land use change, agricultural
productivity, rural social welfare including employment, rural
infrastructure, and financing. County land resources bureaus coor-
dinate with county forestry bureaus to verify plot eligibility. Land
Resources verify new CCFP plots proposed by Forestry to ensure
restoration eligibility, i.e. lands P25 degrees and not classified as
‘‘basic cropland” protected for agriculture. Forestry conducts
research and site analysis to select forest species or grasses for
restoration, and develop technical guidance.
At village level, both township forest stations and village lead-
ers disseminate information on CCFP national policy to households,
including information about advantages and drawbacks of partici-
pation. Township and county forestry staff provide technical sup-
port to participants and conduct annual inspections to ensure
compliance.
Subsidy payments are contingent on maintenance of a mini-
mum threshold of tree cover (80% in most areas). Based on aggre-
gate inspection data, the CCFP Administration transfers inspection
results to instruct the Ministry of Finance to disburse subsidies to
the provinces. Provincial finance departments transfer funds to
county finance bureaus, then to township rural credit cooperatives,
and from there directly to bank accounts of farmers. To ensure
transparency, results of inspections, subsidy payments and land
allocations to households are publicly posted in the village. From
one survey we conducted, over 93% of interviewed farmers con-
firmed to have received their subsidies annually, with 78% affirm-
ing prior inspection of their plots.
To assess the degree of enforcement, our surveys asked what
happens in case household plots do not pass inspection. Common
answers to this question are (1) the situation rarely occurs and
(2) if it does occur, subsidies are suspended, but households are
given opportunities to comply. After compliance (restoring treerepresentation of several of the key features of the CCFP’s network for policy,
and communications processes are not shown here.
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ously skipped. Thus, compliance is encouraged over time. The com-
bination of regular inspection, remuneration contingent on
compliance, but tolerance in terms of allowing households to
improve performance without losing benefits, is a ‘‘light touch”
approach to enforcement and conditionality that works to encour-
age continued compliance while fulfilling the poverty alleviation
goals of the program.3. Forest restoration and forestland tenure reform
A number of years ago, Liu and Edmunds (2003) remarked ‘‘per-
haps no country has made more dramatic steps towards devolving
authority for forest management than the People’s Republic of
China”. Since then, a program of ‘‘Collective Forest Tenure Reform”
(CFTR) piloted from Fujian province in 2003 and upscaled nation-
ally in 2008 resulted in the devolution of 99% of China’s collective
forestland, mostly through 70-year renewable tenure certificates
to individual households. Tenure certificates identify rights holders
and specify forestland use rights, forest and tree ownership, and
other forest/tree use rights.
The CCFP introduced forestland user rights certification inde-
pendently of and in most locations even prior to local implementa-
tion of the CFTR. On launch of the CCFP, counties distributed
information and invited household pre-enrollment. Based on initial
data, county and/or township technicians were trained and
assigned to field investigation teams. These teams consulted with
village heads and households to delimit plots for enrollment on
topographical maps, obtained signatures of participants, created
a database, and issued household tally booklets. Households then
applied for their forestland use rights certificates, based on their
tally books recording plot areas and subsidy information, generally
after 3–4 years of participation, following verification of tree sur-
vivorship and public disclosure in villages.
Because CCFP subsidies are based on the amount of land
enrolled by households, clarification of tenure and completion of
certification processes associated with tenure reforms has been a
crucial element of China’s restoration program. The converse is
also true: the CCFP introduced innovations for tenure certification
and broader reform, building local processes for delimiting hold-
ings and granting certificates.Fig. 2. Documents underpinning participation in the Conversion of Cropland to
Forest Program A rural resident in Shangri-La county, Yunnan province displays her
bankbook and certifications, including those clarifying forestland and grassland
tenure rights. The Conversion of Cropland to Forest Program promoted the
advancement of the institutions behind these documents into more rural and
more marginalized areas of the country. Photo: Kun Zhang.4. The CCFP compensation system and financial inclusion
A recent paper relating to the status of China’s innovations in
finance cites data estimating bank account penetration at around
64 percent of the adult population, with lower reach among rural
populations (small-scale farmers, livestock raisers, and fishermen)
and the poor (Shrader and Duflos, 2014). The same paper cites a
World Bank report from 2009, when ‘‘. . .half of the poor lived in
the western regions of China” noting that ‘‘[p]eople who lived in
remote and mountainous regions or who were from minority eth-
nic groups were three times more likely to be poor” than centrally
located non-minorities. According to this paper, ‘‘banking penetra-
tion is largely driven by low-barrier access to accounts and strong
government policy that allows government transfer payments and
subsidies, such as agricultural subsidies. . .” This in turn, promotes
financial inclusion.
Because the CCFP targets sloping landscapes in upper water-
sheds, implementation has focused on reaching landscapes in hilly
and mountainous regions throughout the country and particularly
in the west, from which the major rivers flow, and in which a
higher percentage of people are ethnic minorities. Since 2004,
when grain subsidies were replaced with digitally-transferred
cash, participants have had an incentive to open accounts withtownship credit cooperatives. In some locations, the village admin-
istration assisted with this process to reduce a potential new bar-
rier to entry.
With the caveat that we do not here assess the degree to which
the program has reached the most excluded groups, it is reasonable
to state that the CCFP’s targeting of 17% of China’s rural population
in upland regions and coverage in western China, combined with
an incentive mechanisms dependent on participants having or
opening bank accounts, is both dependent on and a driver of finan-
cial inclusion.5. Conclusion
To implement China’s largest forest restoration program, the
CCFP, the central government designed a highly articulated net-
work for implementation, inspection and reporting across sectors
and administrative scales. The resulting articulation of the program
with sector ministries of, in particular, agriculture, land resources
and finance, has both facilitated the program and supports parallel
efforts in land tenure reform and financial inclusion (Fig. 2). The
number of rural participants enrolled and the targeted geography
of the program is potentially a driver of more equitable develop-
ment, which is likely an important factor of success in forest land-
scape restoration.
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